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How has the European Union’s inﬂuence on the global stage changed since the turn of the century?
Douglas Webber presents ﬁndings from a study of Europe’s power in seven key policy areas. He
ﬁnds that on every area with the exception of regulatory policy, the EU’s power has either remained
steady or declined since 2003. While some of this decline is attributable to the economic problems
associated with the Eurozone crisis, it is also a mark of the diﬃculty EU leaders have experienced
in negotiating common positions at the European level.
The United States of Europe. The European Superpower. Europe: The Quiet Superpower. Europe’s
Promise. Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century. These book and journal article titles reﬂected the conﬁdence of
their authors, as the 21st century dawned, that the European Union would become a world superpower or even the
dominant power in world aﬀairs. In a recent study, I try to assess how, in the ﬁrst 15 years of the new century, the
EU’s world power has evolved and to what extent these optimistic prognoses have materialised.
For this purpose I deﬁne ‘world power’ as (in this case the EU’s) capacity to cause other actors to behave in ways
that the EU wants and they would not do otherwise. I distinguish between three fundamental types of power
resources or capabilities: Military power, which involves the use or threat of the use of physical force; economic or
ﬁnancial power, which involves the use or threat of the use of negative or positive material sanctions; and ideological
(‘soft’) power. Ideological power may be exercised either directly, as when an actor persuades another of the
inherent desirability of the values that it purports to advance, or indirectly, in as far as it constitutes a ‘model’ that
other actors strive, because of its attractiveness, to emulate. Except in the latter case, the exercise of power typically
requires the mobilisation and deployment of one or some combination of these three diﬀerent kinds of resources or
capabilities.
To assess trends in the EU’s world power, thus deﬁned, I compare and contrast developments and the outcome of
international conﬂicts in several issue-areas in which the EU has been a protagonist during roughly the decade
preceding and the 15 years following the turn of the century. Most issue-areas are the ones – regulatory,
environmental (climate change), trade policy, and the promotion of democracy, human rights and regional
cooperation – in which the advocates of the ‘European superpower’ thesis (and, in some cases, the EU itself)
anticipated that the EU would play a central if not dominant international role. Two others – monetary and security
and defence policy – are issue-areas where, as a result of the launching of the euro and the European Security and
Defence Policy in 1999, numerous observers expected the EU to become an increasingly powerful international
actor. My ﬁndings, summarised in the table below, show that overall the EU is a declining rather than a rising power.
Table: Assessment of the change in EU power in key areas since 2003
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Note: The table shows a summary of the study’s ﬁndings across seven diﬀerent policy areas.
Each assessment of how the EU’s power has changed from 2003 until the present is shown
in the column on the right, based on a comparison of the EU’s actions in the issues shown in
the second and third columns. For more information on the calculations see the author’s
longer paper
Within this overall trend, the EU’s power varies signiﬁcantly by issue-area. Of the issue-areas covered, regulatory
policy is the only one in which the EU’s power has risen and it can fairly be labelled a dominant power. It remains an
important actor in international trade and environmental politics, suggesting that its power is greatest in those issue-
areas where it can deploy its economic and ﬁnancial resources, in particular its control over access to the EU
market. As other scholars have noted, its power also varies signiﬁcantly by geographic location. Beyond its
periphery, where it cannot deploy its ‘accession card’ as an instrument of power, its power weakens rapidly. It is far
more a regional or continental than a genuine world power.
Even on its periphery and in most of the issue-areas where the EU is best equipped to wield inﬂuence, however, its
power appears to be receding. It has not had the same ‘transformative’ impact in the Western Balkans, North Africa
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and Eastern Europe during the last decade that it arguably had prior to 2004 on Central Europe. Nor has it been the
powerful actor in international trade and environmental politics so far in this century that it was in the 1990s.
This judgment applies all the more for the world outside Europe and other issue-areas. In those areas where the EU
is frequently rated a major ideological or ‘soft’ power, relating to democracy, human rights and regional cooperation,
its gravitational pull has weakened. Regional monetary cooperation has found far fewer emulators elsewhere than
did regional trade liberalisation in the wake of the launching of the Single Market project. If the EU cannot be said
actually to have declined (but rather stagnated) as a world security or world monetary power, this is only because it
was neither at the start of the century.
The decline of the EU’s power may be attributed primarily to its relative economic decline, which the Eurozone crisis
has accelerated and accentuated. The diminished size of the single market relative to that of far more rapidly
growing ‘emerging’ countries, especially the BRICS, has weakened the EU’s bargaining power – and not just on
economic and ﬁnancial issues. Economic decline and crisis have diminished the volume of ﬁnancial resources that
the EU can deploy abroad to promote its objectives relating, for example, to climate change and human rights. They
have also reduced the capacity of member states to maintain military spending, thus curtailing the EU’s capacity to
project or credibly threaten to project military power. And they have made the EU a less attractive model for other
regions to emulate, thus damaging its ‘soft power’ as well.
The decline of the EU’s power is nonetheless not a function of the diminution of its material power resources alone.
Still only the US has a comparably large market. Collectively, the armed forces of the member states dwarf those of
any country in the world apart from the US. If its power is declining, then this is attributable partly to the nature of the
EU’s politico-institutional structures and processes, which have frequently made it impossible for the EU to adopt
and implement common policies.
Whilst this has been most evident and dramatic on international security issues, it has also manifested itself in some
issue-areas, such as international trade, where the EU has very strong competences vis-à-vis the member states.
As the EU’s relative economic decline is likely to prove inexorable, even if the Eurozone crisis should one day have
been resolved, its capacity to arrest its declining world power will depend heavily on the extent to which it can – in
fact – integrate more closely politically. After the last decade, only a very optimistic observer could be conﬁdent that
the EU will be equal to this (more modest) challenge, let alone that the current century will turn out to be ‘European’.
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